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---0000000---

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action wherein the
Plaintiffs sought an adjudication in regard to the respective
powers of the Municipal Council and of the Mayor under the
council-mayor optional form of municipal government.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court entered a declaratory judgment
holding that the mayor has only the powers specifically granted
him by statute and that all other powers, including the executive powers not specifically granted to the mayor, are vested
in the municipal council.
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-appellant seeks an adjudication by
this court that under the statutes of the State of Utah in
a municipal government organized and established under the
optional form known as the council-mayor form, all executive
power is vested in the mayor and all legislative power in the
municipal council.

The appellant also seeks reversal of the

trial court's ruling in regard to specific matters where such
rulings are based on erroneous decisions as to the scope of
the mayor's power.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The 1975 session of the Legislature of the State
of Utah enacted the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act,
Act of March 12, 1975, Ch. 33, § 1 et. seq.
Utah 106 (repealed 1977)
Optional Forms Act].

(1975], Laws of

[hereinafter cited as the 1975

In the spring of 1975, citizens of

Logan, Utah, took steps to initiate an election to determine
whether or not the city should adopt the council-mayor form
of government as provided for by the 1975 Optional Forms Act,
§ 10

(1975), in place of the traditional conunission form of

government which had theretofore been in effect.

In an election

held July 1, 1975, the new form of government was approved to
become effective on the 5th day of January, 1976.

The Mayor,
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having two years left to run on his elected term, carried over
from the commission form into the new mayor-council form of
government.

Five new councilmembers were elected in the

municipal election in the fall of 1975.
Within the first year of the operation under the
new form of government, a dispute arose between the Mayor and
three of the members of the municipal council as to the extent
of the Mayor's authority under the new form of government.
Three of the councilmembers took the position that the Mayor
had only those powers specifically delegated to him by statute
while all other municipal powers, both legislative and administrative, were vested in the municipal council.

The Mayor and

two of the oouncilmembers took the position that all of the
executive power was vested in the Mayor and all of the legislative power in the council.
still persists.

That same division of opinion

The three councilmembers that sought to

restrict the Mayor's power were the parties Plaintiff in this
action below, while the other two councilmembers who agreed
with the Mayor in interpreting the scope of his power have
appeared as amicus curiae in this case in support of the
Appellant's position.
The principal points of contention between the
Appellant and the opposing councilmembers have to do with the
Mayor's authority to manage city property -- specifically to
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buy and sell property -- and with the Mayor's authority to
make budget adjustments after the council has adopted a budget.
The Mayor's position was that the new council-mayor form vested ,
in him exclusive authority over all specific property transactions, their being administrative acts exercisable only by
the Mayor as executive within the new separate powers municipal
government.

The municipal council was of the view that, since

Utah statutes did not expressly grant real property authority
to the Mayor, he could not enter into specific transactions
without council approval.

The council also urged that all such

transaction already effected by the Mayor alone were void,
subject to rescission.

Obviously,

a resolution

of this dispute

is a central aim of this appeal.
A dispute also arose below as to the obligation of
the Mayor to provide information to the council.

The Mayor

took the position below that in the absence of a specific
resolution or ordinance by the council, his obligation
under the statutes to report to the council was to report
on the state of the city in the time and form in which he
chose to report.

On the other hand, one councilmember,

f

the Plaintiff Larson, demanded that the Mayor search the records,i
compile and make copies of certain documents and deliver them
to him.

This the Mayor declined to do but did not contest the

right of the Plaintiff Larson to examine the documents in
question and to make copies for himself.

While this appears tc

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-s-

be a rather petty argument, it shows the extent to which
differing interpretations of the parties' respective powers
and duties disrupted city governance and underscores the need
for a definitive ruling on these questions from this court.
During the evidentiary hearing on the case, it
developed that there was no dispute between the Plaintiff and
Defendant as to some of the claims for relief set forth in
the complaint.

In regard to the third claim for relief, both

sides agreed that the Mayor could make intra-departmental
budget transfers without council approval but could not make
inter-departmental transfers without such approval.'

The court

held that there was one incident of an inter-departmental
transfer made by the Mayor without council approval.

Appellant

is unable to identify any evidence substantiating this holding,
but in view of the fact that both sides agree as to the general
principle, there seems to be no need for declaratory relief on
this particular issue.
However, the court held below that even in case of
an intra-departmental transfer, the Mayor cannot use funds
from a specifically budgeted-for item to purchase a different
object even in cases of need, without council approval, but
may only readjust uncommitted funds.

The Mayor, on the other

hand, contends that within a department, specific mention of
particular items to be purchased are advisory only and that
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the Mayor with the consent of the Budget Officer may transfer
funds which are recommended for the purchase of a road grader,
for example, to the purchase of an automobile or even to the
employment of additional personnel, as the city's needs indicate.
In regard to the Fourth Claim for Relief, The Approval
of Subdivisions, Appellant agrees that while the approval and
recording of subdivision plats is in the nature of an executive
action, because of the peculiar wording of the state statute,
this power rests with the council.

However, it is the position

of the Appellant that a valid delegation of such authority to
the Mayor was made by the council, by ordinance. (Record, p. 24l·il
In regard to the Fifth Claim for Relief, Appeilant
agrees that the council may spend city funds for the prosecution of this action to determine their rights and duties.

On

the other hand, appellant questions the right of the council
to use city funds to pay for legal services to set aside consurmnated real estate transactions made by the Mayor.

Both

sides agree, however, that the resolution of this matter depends:
upon the resolution of the main question in this action, namely,
did the Mayor have the right to make the real estate sales
and purchases?
The Seventh Claim for Relief was dismissed by
stipulation.
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Therefore, this case distills to a determination
of the following issues:
1.

Does the alternate council-mayor form of

government create a true separate-powers government thereby
vesting the whole of executive power in the Mayor?
2.

Is the management of city property, including

the purchase and sale of property within budget limitations,
an executive power?
3.

Is the decision to adjust committed funds from

one item to another as the city's needs dictate an executive
power and, therefore, not subject to the specific departmental
budget recommendations made by the municipal council?
4.

What is the extent of the Mayor's obligation

to assemble information for individual councilmernbers?
It is the position of the Appellant that the factual
situation was not sufficiently clear for the court below to
have granted summary judgment on several of the points
covered in the first order.

However, the factual situation

is sufficiently clear at the present time as a result of the
later evidentiary hearing to enable this court and counsel to
delineate the basic issues presented by this case.

Appellant,

therefore, will not press on appeal the question of the propriety
of the summary judgment.
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE 1977 ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT ACT GOVERNS ALL GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS IN
A CITY ADOPTING A COUNCIL-MAYOR FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND PROVIDES FOR A COMPLETE SEPARATION OF
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWER.
It is Appellant's position that Utah's legislature
intended the optional council-mayor form of municipal government established by the 1975 Optional Forms Act, as amended
~Utah

Code Ann., §10-3-1201, et seq.

(Supp. 1977), to be

patterned after the federal and state separate-power models.
See U.S. Const., art. I. §I, art. II §1; Utah Const., art. V
§1.

The point of departure in any analysis of a particular

type of governmental power is the organic law that creates
the government itself.

In the case of the federal and state

governments, this creating body of law consists of these
respective constitutions.

In the case of the municipal model,

state statutes are the creating law.
Initially, the state's legislature determines that
the needs of the citizenry would be served by smaller, more
localized, units of social order.

Thus state statutes create

municipalities -- new "governments" albiet in an abstract
sense.

(Utah Code Ann., §10-1-201 (Supp. 1977), repealing,

§10-7-1 (1953)).
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Since these municipal governments cannot serve the
needs of their respective populaces unless they are vested
with the ability to act in concrete ways, the state legislature
next determines what actions these governments must be able
to take.

Having determined that it will further the general

welfare if municipal governments are able to maintain order,
to regulate conduct, and to provide for the needs of their
citizens as they arise, the state legislature acts to grant
these entities the specific power to do so.

Obviously, when

the legislature undertakes to grant the municipal government
power to act, it grants the whole of that power -- both its
legislative and its administrative components.

This general

vesting of the power in municipal government to act

as an

entity is reflected in Chapter B of Title 10 of the 1953 Utah
Code, entitled "Powers and Duties of All Cities."

This body

of legislation operates as a general grant of the power to
act as a government to municipalities.
Section 10-8-2 of the Code empowers the municipal
government to:
purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease,
convey and dispose of property real
and personal for the benefit of the
city . . . .
This legislation only grants the governmental entity the
specified power -- it says nothing about the manner of its
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exercise.

Nor does the statute attempt to separate the

power to manage city property into its legislative or ad.ministrative components.

Again, the statute simply vests the

"whole" power over city property in the municipal governmental
unit.
Having created the municipal unit of government and
having vested it with power over its property and citizens,
the state legislature then specifies the form under which the
new governmental entity will operate.

Utah municipalities

have traditionally governed through a single body.

Sometimes

the body was referred to as the "City Council," or "City Commissij
and sometimes as the "governing body. "

There has" not tradi tiona::i.

been any provision for a separation of legislative from executive powers.

See Utah Code Ann., §10-6-1 to 3 (1953), repealed

by §10-1-114 (Supp. 1977), repealing, §10-6-35 (1975).

Even

under the 1977 Optional Forms Act, one of the two optional forms
provided for -- the council-manager form

continues to vest

both executive and legislative functions in a single body.
Although Utah cities were, prior to the 1975 Optional
Forms Act, authorized to operate via a mayor and city council
or via city commission alone, the council or commission was
the part of the city government that held all of the "government;
power.

Where there was a mayor, he was simply an administrator,

having no vote on policy matters, and no veto. See Utah Code .1\Jlf:·
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§10-6-24 (1953), repealed, §10-1-114 (Supp. 1977).

Thus,

while the traditional city mayor might be said to have been
a part of municipal government, he held no municipal governmental power, this having been vested in the council by virtue
of the statutorily specified form of its exercise.

In other

words, prior to 1975, the whole of governmental power, both
executive and legislative, was vested in city councils and
boards of commission simply because that was the only statutorily
allowed means of exercising municipal government power.
In 1975, however, the state legislature saw fit to
provide an alternative to all Utah cities.

This Act did not

alter the existence of local governments, nor did it expand
or contract the scope of the power vested in these units of
government.

1975 Optional Forms Act, §6.

What it did was to

provide new forms for the exercise of this governmental power
because:
increasingdemandsfor services and growing
citizen awareness and concern [had] strained
the ability of Utah's local governments to
respond effectively [and there was therefore]
a need to provide optional forms of municipal
government under which citizens may vote to
organize to meet their needs and desires.
Id. §4, U.C.A. §10-6-112 (1975) repealed, §10-1-114 (Supp. 1977).
One of the alternatives created to meet these new
demands was the council-mayor form.

This change in form

affected municipal governments in two ways.

First, it vested
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the mayor with governmental power formerly reserved exclusively
to councils and to commissions, 1975 Optional Forms Act, §10.
Second, it divided this vested governmental power into its
executive and legislative components for the first time.

See

Id., §21.

Unfortunately, the state legislature assumed that
it would be clear that this new council-mayor form was to be
patterned after the state and federal separate-powers governments.

Because this was not made explicit, the 1977 legislature (

added the following clarifications:
§10-3-101. Each municipality shall have
a governing body which shall exercise the
legislative and executive powers of the
municipalityl:i:Illess the municipality is
organized with separate executive and
legislative branches of government.

§10-3-1209. The optional form of government known as the council-mayor form vests
the government of a municipality which
adopts this form in two separate, independent and equal branches of municipal
government; the executive branch consisting
of a mayor and the administrative departments and officers; and the legislative
branch consisting of a municipal council.
(Emphasis added)
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, Utah Code Ann.,
et ~·

(Supp. 1977)

[hereinafter cited as the 1977 Optional

Forms Act].
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The court below recognized that the 1977 Act
was merely a more explicit statement of the intent of the
1975 Act when it stated in its final declaratory summary
judgment:
The functions of the council embodied in
this section are retained in Section
10-3-1201 of Senate Bill 204, but it does
eliminate the phrase that the municipal
council is the governing body. However,
the functions and duties of the council
and the functions and duties of the
mayors are not substantially changed and
remain basically the same.
(R. p. 440).
Finally, therefore, the Utah State Legislature has
created a means by which a municipality can exercise its
governmental powers that is completely in accord with the
federal and state models.

Clearly, this new optional form

modifies the literal language of Chapter 8 of Title 10 of the
Utah Code.

Now the "Powers and Duties of all Cities," vest

in city councils exclusively, only in cases where the traditional governmental forms are retained.

Where the new,

optional council-mayor form is implemented, the whole of
governmental powers vests in both the mayor and the municipal
council.

But, again consistent with the federal and state

prototypes, the power is divided.

The whole of the executive

power now vests exclusively in the mayor.

The whole of the

legislative power now vests exclusively in the municipal council.
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The 1977 Optional Forms Act is relatively short.
The legislature did not attempt to revise all of the municipal
statutes to make them applicable to the new council-mayor
form of government nor to specifically explain the effect of
the new Act on their interpretation.
Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1205,

Rather, it provided in

(Supp. 1977):

Any municipality operating under this
part shall retain and have the right,
powers and duties now or hereafter
granted to municipalities of the same
class and those rights, powers and duties
which could be granted the municipalities
of the same class.
Therefore, those statutes creating municipalities
and granting them corporate powers apply fully to the new
form.

The interpretation of those statutes, however, with

respect to the manner of the exercise of those governmental
powers is modified by the division of power established by
the new council-mayor form.

In short, where the general

municipal laws are consistent with the council-mayor form,
they are to be literally applied.

Where they are not consis-

tent, they are superseded and modified to the extent of the
incompatability.
The difficulty in this case

arises principally

from the fact that the general municipal law frequently provides that all municipal governmental power is vested in the
"governing body" or in the city council or board of corrunissioner:
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To repeat for emphasis, these provisions were all designed
to apply to a form of government where the executive and
legislative powers were vested in a single "governing body."
However, the term "governing body" ceases to have any meaning
in a mayor-council form because there is no longer such a
single entity.

Indeed, as was shown above, the statutes vest-

ing governmental power in any single body are completely
modified as applied to this new, separate-powers form of
government.
Despite the explicit language contained in the
1977 Optional Forms Act, and the logical modification the Act
has had on the general municipal statutes, Respondents continue
to maintain that some inherent part of the executive power
resides in the municipal council.

This position is taken in

the memoranda submitted to the trial court by counsel for the
Respondents and during oral argument before the trial court.
At the time of the evidentiary hearings, counsel for the
Respondents stated:
We think, your Honor, that there is a
question and that is a very important
question, we think that, as Mr. Rampton
framed it here, it is in part a
question and fundamentally a question
as to whether any administrative powers
reside in the Council or whether they
are in fact only and solely a legislative body.
(Tr. p. 130)
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In spite of the fact that the law now specifically
provides that there is no governing body under the council-mayor
form of government and that the intent of the law clearly is
that the whole of executive power shall be vested in the
mayor and only the legislative powers in the council, the trial
court agreed with Respondents and held that the general powers
of the municipality, both legislative and executive, reside in
the council except where specifically by statute, e.g. Utah
Code Ann. §10-3-1219 (Supp. 1977), they are granted the mayor.
Appellant has shown, however, that the question of
who is vested with what specific power is not a question of
statutory provision, but is, as in all separate-powers
governments, a question of whether the power is executive or
legislative in nature.

The distinction between executive· and

legislative powers and functions is elaborated below.

Never-

theless, it bears noting here that in the case of property
transactions, the mayor in this new form has power over specific
sales, exchanges, leases and purchases.

The council, subject

always to mayoral veto, has exclusive power over the amount of
monies to be spent and over the general policies that broadly
govern all transactions.

The same holds true of budget matters.

The council's exclusive province is to fix the total departmental budget and amounts.

The mayor has the exclusive power
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to make adjustments within the budgets as the need arises.
No other interpretation is consistent with the distinction
between legislative and executive functions as established
by this court.
The court below ruled that Logan's municipal council
has "exclusive" power over all aspects of city real property
transactions (Record, p. 441).

This property issue alone

warrants this court's reversal and clarification of the rule
of law applied.
Appellant has shown that the council-mayor form of
municipal government in the context of which this action arose
is a true separate-powers form of government.

Appellant will

establish below that the acts he took with respect to real
property transactions were clearly executive and administrative
and not legislative within the rule established by this court.
It necessarily follows, therefore, that the lower court's
decision constitutes an impermissible violation of the fundamental separation of the powers of municipal government established
by the citizens of Logan City.

This court has been adamant in its refusal to condone
violations of the separation of governmental powers established
by the Utah State Constitution.

In Rampton v. Barlow, 23 U.2d

383, 464 P.2d 378 (1970), this court struck down an attempt by
the state legislature to infringe on the governor's power of
appointment.
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It may be stated then, as a general rule
inherent in the American constitutional system,
that, unless otherwise expressly provided or
incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or
judicial power; the judiciary cannot exercise
either executive or legislative power. The
existence in the various constitutions of occasional provisions expressly giving to one of
the departments powers which by their nature
otherwise would fall within the general scope
of the authority of another department emphasizes,
rather than casts doubt upon, the generally
inviolate character of this basic rule.
Legislative power, as distinguished from
executive power, is the authority to make laws,
but not to enforce them or appoint the agents
charged with the duty of such enforcement. The
latter are executive functions . . . •
464 P.2d at 381, quoting with approval, Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928).

Cf. Taylor v. Lee,

226 P.2d 531, 534-37 (1951).
Since the optional council-mayor form was intended
by the legislature to function as does the state model, it
follows that this court should be as sensitive to violations
of the separation of powers in the former case as it is in
the latter.

Indeed, if this court does not apply the same

standards to this new separate-powers form of municipal government that it does to its state counterpart, it will itself
have violated the separation of judicial from legislative
functions fixed by Article V of the Utah Constitution.

For

if this court approves the lower court's decision, it will
have judicially repealed the Optional Forms of Municipal
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Governments Act.

This court will have declared that there

are no options of government available to municipalities
and that all Utah cities are once again relegated to the old
system of governance exclusively by a single body

the city

council or commission.
POINT II
THE AUTHORITY TO MANAGE CITY PROPERTY, INCLUDING THE POWER TO SELL AND -- WITHIN BUDGETARY
LIMITS -- TO PURCHASE IS AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION.
It is the Respondents' position in this case that
the authority to manage city property and to purchase and sell
property is vested exclusively in the municipal council.

This

is based upon the language in the general municipal statutes
that such authority is granted to the city council or board
of commissioners.

Appellant has already established, however,

that these general municipal statutes do not literally apply
to the alternate council-mayor form.

Rather the general statutes

now vest these powers in the mayor and in the council.

The

specific manner of exercise, in this case who shall enter into
specific real estate transactions, now depends solely on
whether the action is an executive or a legislative function.
It is obvious that there will be few cases directly
on this point for the reason that substantially all of the
cases delineating the power of municipal councils or commissions
are concerned with the structure of municipal government where
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the executive and legislative are combined in a single body.
It is possible, however, to approach this matter on the basis
of court decisions applying to state government where there
is a clear division of powers, as the Appellant has shown
there is under the council-mayor form of municipal government.
Considerable light is shed on this subject from cases interpreting the referendum laws as they apply to municipal
governments.
Even though legislative and executive functions are
combined in the conventional forms of municipal government,
laws of most states, including the State of Utah, have been
interpreted to hold that only municipal governmental action
of a legislative nature may be the subject of a referendum,
while actions of an executive-administrative nature are exempt
from provisions of the referendum law.

This principle is

firmly established in the State of Utah by the case of
Keigley, et al. v. Bench, City Recorder, 97 Utah 69, 89 P.2d
480 (1939).

Following Keigley, other Utah cases have made a

determination under the referendum laws in regard to particular
matters in determining whether such matters were legislative
or executive in character.
One case that is very helpful in this regard is
the case of Bird v. Sorenson, 16 U.2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
In that case, the City of Washington Terrace in Weber county
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had in effect a master zoning plan ordinance which had been
properly adopted by the city council.

Thereafter, the council,

by ordinance, changed a specific piece of property from one

classification to another.

An attempt was made to submit the

latter specific ordinance to the people under the referendum
law.

This court held that the ordinance assigning the specific

piece of property to a specific classification was an administrative and not a legislative matter and that therefore the
ordinance was not subject to the referendum provisions.
The similarity to this case is obvious.

Id.

In Bird the

act establishing the zoning classifications and providing for
the restrictions which would apply to each classification was
legislative in character.

Assigning a specific piece of

property to a specific classification,on the other hand, was
executive in character.

In this case, Appellant agrees that

the council had full legislative authority to prescribe by
ordinance general rules to be followed by the executive branch
in purchasing or selling property.

They could, for example,

have provided procedures for the giving of notice and the taking
of bids.

However, a determination that Tract A should be sold

by the city to John Doe is not a legislative act;

executive act.

it is an

It is final and binding upon the city as being

done by the executive in the manner prescribed by the general
law.
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There are several cases from other jurisdictions
which support this position.

In the Oregon case of Monahan v.

Funk, 137 Ore. 589, 3 P.2d 778 (1931), the council authorized
the purchase of a specific piece of real property to be used
by the City of Portland for a crematory site.

An effort was

made to cause the ordinance to be submitted to a referendum.
The court held that the ordinance directing the purchase of a
specific piece of property was administrative in nature and
was therefore not subject to referendum.

The following language

from the court is helpful in this regard:
The act of purchasing a parcel of real
estate is no more legislative than the
act of purchasing a fire engine and
truck.
It is not the enactment of a
permanent law for the guidance of the
citizens of Portland.
[citation omitted]

When the city of Portland receives
the title to the land described in the
ordinance and pays the purchase price
thereof, the ordinance in question will
practically be defunct.
It prescribes
no rule of civil conduct; it is not
permanent, uniform, or universal in its
application to the general public.
It
was a carrying out of the business of
the council by giving authority to the
commissioner of public utilities for convenience in effecting the transaction.
Id. at 780.
In the Kansas case, State ex rel Frank v. Salome,
167 Kan. 766, 208 P.2d 198 (1949), the Board of Commissioners
of the City of Wichita passed a resolution granting a right
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of way for a flood control project to the Army Corps of
Engineers.

An attempt was made to submit the matter to

referendum.

The court held that the ordinance was not one

of general application, but was one applying to a specific
piece of property and was enacted to carry out general policy
and, therefore, was executive in nature and not subject to
referendum.
An annotation on this subject is found at 122 A.L.R.
776

(1939).

The general holding of that part of the annota-

tion entitled "Acquisitions of Property by Municipalities" and
the cases there cited, is that the acquisition of specific
pieces of property, even though directed by ordinance in the
case of a council or commission having both legislative and
executive powers, is an act administrative in nature rather
than legislative and therefore not subject to referendum.
A case directly in point involving the management
of public property as applied to state government is a South
Carolina case, Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District,

44 S.E.2d 88

(S.C. 1947).

In that case, the legislature

created an auditorium district and provided that two members
of the legislature should

sit on the board of trustees which

managed such district properties.

The court in declaring such

provisions unconstitutional, stated:
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An enlightening discussion of the
quoted provision is found in Spartanburg
County v. Miller, 135 SC 348, 132 SE 673,
677, where it was said:
"As a general
rule the Legislature of the state may not,
consistently with the constitutional
requirement here involved, undertake both
to pass laws and to execute them by setting
its own members to the task of discharging
such functions by virtue of their offices
as legislators, would seem to be selfevident. The principle, as we apprehend,
upon the correct application of which
depends the solution of any such problem
as to the exercise by the Legislature of
nonlegislative functions, is that the
Legislature may properly engage in the
disch~rge of such functions to the extent,
and to the extent only, that their performance is reasonably incidental to the
full and effective exercise of its legislative powers." Paraphrasing the sentence
which precedes this quotation from the
opinion, it may be said that the members
of the Legislature from Greenville County
were elected for the purpose of making
laws, not administering them.

In 1976, the majority of the Logan municipal council
expressed its recognition of the fact that the sale and
purchase of property is an executive function not within the
jurisdiction of the council.

On the 16th day of September,

the council amended the Logan City, Utah, Ordinances §17-3-3,
to read as follows:
(a)
No real estate, except cemetery lots,
may be sold, traded or purchased by the
executive branch of city government unless
and until said proposed sale, trade or
purchase is presented to the Municipal
Council for its information and suggestions,
if any.
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(b)
The executive branch of government
shall not lease any city real property for
a term more than five years unless and
until the proposed lease is presented to
the Municipal Council for its information
and suggestions, if any.
(Defendant's Exhibit #8)
While this ordinance was being discussed, one of the
councilmembers moved to amend it to add the words "with Municipal
Council approval."

Such motion died for want of a second

(Defendant's Exhibit #9).

It appears, therefore, that the

majority of the council clearly recognized the executive power
to buy and sell property and were merely exercising the wellestablished legislative function of legislative oversight.
Under this principle, the legislature can review executive
actions for the purpose of making possible decisions on future
legislation, even though they do not have the power to approve
or disapprove the action taken.
The court below brushed aside the above ordinance
by stating that the council could not delegate the power to
buy and sell property to the administrative branch by inference,
although it could by a direct delegation.

In so holding, the

trial court missed Appellant's point entirely.

Appellant's

contention was not that this assigned the power by implication;
his position was, and is, that the power clearly resided in
the executive branch and the adoption of the ordinance was a
recognition of that fact.
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POINT III
THE POWER TO APPROVE SUBDIVISION PLANS HAS
BEEN DELEGATED BY THE COUNCIL TO THE MAYOR.

An anomalous situation arises in regard to the
recordation of subdivision plans.
to be an executive function.

This appears quite clearly

However, the statutory section

covering the approval of subdivision plans, Utah Code Ann.
§10-9-25,

(1953) specifically provides that no subdivision

plat may be recorded until the "legislative body has approved
it and has noted its approval in writing on the plat itself."
If the statute used the term "governing body" it would be
Appellant's position, for the reasons heretofore stated, that
the power was vested in the Mayor.

However, as the statute

specifically uses the term "legislative body" under the
division of powers doctrine, this power of final approval
undoubtedly is vested in the council.
This in no way, however, argues against Appellant's
general position that under the council-mayor form of government the general executive powers are vested in the Mayor.
In fact, it strengthens that position for the reasons set
forth by the Supreme Court in Springer v. Philippine Islands:
The existence in the various constitutions
of occasional provisions expressly giving
to one of the departments powers which by
their nature otherwise would fall within
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the general scope of the authority of
another department emphasizes, rather than
casts doubt upon, the generally inviolate
character of this basic rule.
277 U.S. at 202, 72 L.Ed at 849, quoted with approval in
Rampton v. Barlow, supra, at 381.
This matter becomes of importance in this case
because the Mayor has been approving and having recorded plats
for what are known as inner block and cluster developments,
but which appear to be, in effect, subdivisions.

The authority

to take such actions has been delegated to the Mayor by
§17-3-1 and §17-3-2 of the Logan City Ordinances.
text of these ordinances appear at R. p. 241-48.

The complete
An examination

of these ordinances, adopted on July 15th and July 20th, 1976,
will clearly show that the municipal council delegated this
final approval and recordation power to the Mayor, and properly
accompanied this delegation with explicit and detailed guidelines as to the exercise of the delegated power.
The trial court, however, held that, as the state
statute specifically delegates to the "legislative body" the
authority to approve subdivision plats, this function cannot
be delegated.

The matter of the delegation of legislative

powers is the subject of a great body of law in this country.
A full review of the cases is not required here.

The general

and almost uniformly accepted rule is that the legislative
Power can be delegated by the legislature to an administrative
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body provided that the delegation is accompanied by sufficiently definite guidelines to make certain that the administrators in exercising the delegated power are exercising
it in accordance with the legislative intent.

See Panama

Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 US 288, 79 L.Ed. 446

(1934).

See

also, Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 442, 211 P.2d 190,
192-3 (1949); Revne v. Trade Commission, 113 Utah 155, 192
P.2d 563, 467 (1948).

The trial court erred, therefore, not

in its holding that this power is assigned by statute to the
council, but in its holding that it was not and could not be
delegated to the Mayor even when accompanied by detailed
guidelines.
POINT IV
THE BUDGET OFFICER, WITH THE APPROVAL OF
THE MAYOR, MAY TRANSFER FUNDS WITHIN A
DEPARTMENTAL BUDGET WITHOUT PRIOR MUNICIPAL COUNCIL APPROVAL.
The Appellant, Respondents and the court below are
all in agreement on the general principle with regard to
budgetary transfers.

The problem comes, however, in regard

to the specific application of the principles.

Budgeting in

all municipalities is governed by the Uniform Municipal Fiscal '
Procedures Act.

Utah Code Ann. §10-10-46

(1953) provides as

follows:
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With the consent of the budget officer,
the head of any department may transfer
any unencwnbered or unexpended appropriation balance or any portion thereof
from one expenditure account to another
within the department during the budget
year, or an excess expenditure of one or
more line items may be permitted by any
department head with the consent of the
budget officer, provided the total of
all excess expenditures or encwnbrances
do not exceed total unused appropriations
within the department at the close of the
budget year.
Although the quoted section refers to "line items,"
nowhere in the Code is this defined.

Frequently, within a

departmental budget, certain capital items which the legislature
intends shall be purchased, are listed as units going to make
up the total of the departmental budget.

The question is

whether those individual listings, or the composite total of
the departmental appropriation are what is meant by the term
"line item."
on this point.

Counsel has found no case law that is helpful
However, it may be helpful to have reference

to the appropriation acts of the State of Utah for illustrative
purposes.

A good example is the appropriation for the Department

of Development Services, Act of February 28, 1975, Ch. 213,
Item 51 (1975] Laws of Utah 1025.

The entire appropriation to

the department is included in line item 51.

It is clear that

the department head, or the Governor, cannot transfer money
from item 51 to item 52.

However, within item 51, even though

there are listed 6 specific schedules of programs with a dollar
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figure after each one, the department head with the consent
of the Governor may transfer funds from one program to another.
For example, they may transfer money from library to mansion
maintenance.
Comparing this with the budget documents of Logan
City, Plaintiff's Exhibit #14, it would appear that the designa·
ti on of specific dollars for specific uni ts within a departmenta:
budget are advisory only and are used for the purpose of
constructing the budget, as with the case of the schedule of
programs under state appropriation acts, but are subject to
modification by the budget officer and the department head
as operations during the year may indicate that good management necessitates some transfer within a department.
For example, let us suppose that $4500 is indicated
in the budget request for the purchase of a passenger automobile.,
Does that mean that the passenger automobile must be purchased
for $4500, no more, no less?

Certainly, if it were purchased

for less than the $4500, by the specific authorization of Utah
Code Ann. §10-10-46 (1953), the amount not used could be
transferred for another purpose within the department.

Suppose

that during the operation of the department during the year
the passenger automobile which was to be replaced by the new
I

car held up better than expected, but a truck which was believeci
to have been in good condition broke down.

Can the department
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head, with the approval of the budget officer, spend the
money instead for a truck, or must he proceed to purchase
the passenger automobile?

It should be obvious that the

exigencies of governance require that the administrative
department have considerable latitude in adjusting funds,
provided it does not go over the amount appropriated and
provided it does not attempt to transfer funds from one
department to another.
The Logan City Auditor, who was called as a witness
by the Plaintiffs, testified that since implementation of the

new government, budgetary procedures, including the transfer
of funds, have been conducted exactly as they have been conducted over the past several years (Tr. 110).

With that pre-

cedent, Appellant submits that state law allows the head of
the department, with the permission of the budget officer, to
transfer funds within a departmental budget, notwithstanding
the fact that there may have been an indication within the
departmental budget that at the time of the construction of
the budget certain funds were intended for certain specific
purposes.
POINT V
THE MAYOR HAS NO OBLIGATION TO ASSEMBLE DATA AND
DELIVER IT TO AN INDIVIDUAL COUNCILMEMBER ON DEMAND.
The evidence in the case shows that at no time did
the Mayor deny councilman Larson access to the city records,
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with the right to inspect the same and make his own copies.
The Mayor merely declined to research voluminous city records,
assemble the copies and deliver them himself to the Councilman.
It does not appear that there was any violation of the law
by either side here and the court below did not specifically
find that there was, despite an inference from the Memorandum
Opinion to the contrary.

Counsel, therefore, will not burden

this court with this rather petty matter, except to re-emphasize'
the extent to which a clarification of the respective powers
and duties of the principals in the new council-mayor form is
needed to prevent disruptions of city government and to effect
the intent of the state legislature.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COUNCIL
COULD EXPEND CITY FUNDS FOR LEGAL SERVICES
TO SET ASIDE PAST SALES OF REAL PROPERTY
EXECUTED BY THE MAYOR.
The court held that the council could use city
funds to hire an attorney to set aside certain real estate
transactions which the council alleged were made without
authority.

At the evidentiary hearing on the matter, both

sides agreed (Tr. 9-11) that the correctness of this holding
would depend upon the correctness of the lower court's
holding as to the Mayor's power to manage city property.
Therefore, if Appellant prevails in regard to the main issue
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in this case, it follows that the finding of the court regarding the payment of attorney's fees in cases to set aside real
property transactions should be reversed.

Appellant does not

question the right of the Respondents to employ and pay for
out of city funds counsel to conduct the case now before the
court.
CONCLUSION
Counsel recognizes that it is the function of this
court to decide specific cases rather than to issue broad
proclamations of law.

However, we would fail in our duty to

this court if we did not point out that the decision in this
case will have application far beyond the particular actions
which gave rise to this case.

It will have application far

beyond Logan City, because this is the first case to reach
this court and perhaps any court of final jurisdiction in
this country defining powers and duties between the executive
and the legislative branches in a municipality that operates
under a division of powers system of government rather than
under a council or conunission having joint legislative and
executive authority.

Presumably, if this proves to be a

viable form, Logan will be followed by other cities and towns
in the State of Utah.

The court's decision in this case will

become a landmark in the field of municipal governmental law.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of January,

1978.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK

&

McDONOUGH
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